Whatever you make of intelligence chief Tahir Jalil Habbush telling MI6/SIS before the Iraq war that Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction, that the incident happened is not in doubt. What is outrageous is that none of the UK inquiries made any mention of it. Reference to the exchange is conspicuous by its absence from the relevant sections of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and Butler reports. Once again, you have to ask, what is the point of the establishment inquiry if it is only given half the picture?

It seems that both Sir Richard Dearlove, then head of MI6/SIS, and former CIA chief George Tenet have confirmed that MI6 did meet Habbush and were told that Iraq had got rid of its wmd. Dearlove is quoted in Ron Suskind’s book, The Way of the World, while Tenet has issued his own statement. But the statement raises more questions than it answers:

the source in question failed to persuade his British interlocutors that he had anything new to offer by way of intelligence, concessions, or negotiations with regard to the Iraq crisis and the British — on their own — elected to break off contact with him.

There were many Iraqi officials who said both publicly and privately that Iraq had no WMD — but our foreign intelligence colleagues and we assessed that these individuals were parroting the Ba’ath party line and trying to delay any coalition attack. The particular source that Suskind cites offered no evidence to back up his assertion and acted in an evasive and unconvincing manner.

Tenet’s point that "he would say that" is fair enough. But as well as providing confirmation that Habbush was a “source”, Tenet confirms that Britain “assessed” his and other claims.

Where are the references in the ISC and Butler reports to any “source” telling MI6/SIS that Iraq did not have wmd? Both discussed the situation in early 2003 and the Joint Intelligence Committee’s assessments.

The ISC report says at paragraph 122:

The JIC Assessment issued immediately prior to coalition action against Iraq, dated 19 March 2003, stated that a report from a reliable source in mid-March indicated that Iraq’s chemical weapons remained disassembled and that Saddam had not yet ordered their assembly.

No mention of any source saying that there were no chemical (or biological) weapons. The same goes for the Butler Review, although it went through MI6/SIS’s sources in some detail. Butler does however observe

we are surprised that neither policy-makers nor the intelligence community, as the generally negative results ofUNMOVIC inspections became increasingly apparent, conducted a formal re-evaluation of the quality of the intelligence and hence of the assessments made on it. We have noted in departmental papers expressions of concern about the impact on public and international opinion of the lack of strong evidence of Iraqi violation of its disarmament obligations. But those involved appear to have operated on the presumption that the intelligence was right, and that it was because of the combination of Iraqi concealment and deception activities and perceived UNMOVIC weaknesses that such evidence was not found.

More concerned with spinning than asking tough questions. The Butler Review also goes through the process by which attorney general Lord Goldsmith advised Tony Blair and the Cabinet on the dubious legality of the war.

383. Following the end of negotiations in the United Nations on a further Security Council resolution, the Legal Secretary to the Attorney General wrote to the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister on 14 March 2003 seeking confirmation that:

. . . it is unequivocally the Prime Minister’s view that Iraq has committed further material breaches as specified in paragraph 4 of resolution 1441.

384. The Prime Minister’s Private Secretary replied to the Legal Secretary on 15 March, confirming that:

. . . it is indeed the Prime Minister’s unequivocal view that Iraq is in further material breach of its obligations,as in OP418 of UNSCR 1441, because of ‘false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq to comply with,and co-operate fully in the implementation of,this resolution’.

385. We have been told that, in coming to his view that Iraq was in further material breach, the Prime Minister took account both of the overall intelligence picture and of information from a wide range of other sources, including especially UNMOVIC information.

So, Goldsmith’s view that the war could be legal depended on Blair asserting that Iraq had committed (plural) breaches of its disarmament obligations. Blair cited two, the first of which was that Iraq had made false statements. Presumably this was made on the basis of the intelligence picture. Again, Blair may have been entitled to discount Habbush’s assertions, but surely Butler should have known – and reported – that he had done so.