The JIC position

In March 2002 the JIC produced a formal paper that included an assessment of Iraq’s nuclear programme. This was extremely equivocal. In the main text it was stated, "Although there is very little intelligence, we continue to judge that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme." This was further qualified, "…but we do not know if large scale development work has yet recommenced." In fact, it was not believed that any nuclear programme would get very far:

"While sanctions remain effective, Iraq cannot indigenously develop and produce nuclear weapons. If sanctions were removed or became ineffective, it would take at least five years to produce a nuclear weapon. This timescale would shorten if fissile material was acquired from abroad." Butler Review page 171

Shorter and shorter timescales

But as soon as this assessment began to be translated into what became the dossier, shorter and shorter timescales were quoted. In the pre-September version of the dossier and those produced in early September, it was said that progress would be "much quicker". Following John Williams' "missing" 9 September draft, the 10 September draft quantified this for the first time, as "at least two years". At some point during the next six days, the minimum time within which Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon had halved. By the time of the 16 September draft, it was "between one and two years" (para 24).

In response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act, the Cabinet Office was unable to cite any basis for them. This merely confirms what was already quite obvious – they were simply made up.

Pressure to drop the longer timescales

Having achieved a dramatic headline figure, the government’s spin doctors then applied pressure to have the less dramatic timescales dropped. At the Hutton Inquiry, Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6/SIS confirmed that there had been a "debate over the amount of time it might take the Iraqis to develop a nuclear weapon", (Section 94) but claimed that there was "a rigorous response to questions in terms of sticking with the original intelligence in recording those issues in the dossier." Although Inquiry QC James Dingemans recognised that "debate" was code for a dispute, he showed the narrowness of the Inquiry:

"We are not interested in any disputes beyond the 45 minutes source because that was what Dr Kelly appears to have commented on."

It is not clear whether the "debate" took place before 16 September or subsequently. Certainly "rigorous" is not an appropriate description of the addition of a fabricated timeline. But it appears that there was also pressure before 16 September to remove the longer timescales. In an email on 17 September Downing Street press officer Daniel Pruce reported that the latest draft dossier "kept in the longer nuclear timelines". The Cabinet Office is also withholding documents relating to the period between 10 and 16 September and these may well record such pressure. Although the true, longer JIC timelines did remain in the published dossier, Alastair Campbell then "bombarded" JIC chairman John Scarlett with requests to rewrite the nuclear section so that those timescales would be undercut by the fabricated one.

Campbell bombards Scarlett

In the WMD chapter of the dossier, each section began with a paragraph or two setting out the JIC’s standing assessments on the type of weapon that it covered. Initially there was to be a single chapter, representing a history of JIC assessments . By the time of the 16 September draft, this had been split up, but careful readers could still see which claims represented existing JIC assessments and which did not.

But it worried Blair, Campbell and everyone who looked at the dossier that what was paragraph 18 set out the JIC’s definitive, quite negative, position on nuclear issues. Campbell told Scarlett that it left one of his special advisers (Joanna Nadin) "thinking there’s nothing much to worry about". He said, "Sorry to bombard on this point, but I do worry that the nuclear section will become the main focus and as currently drafted, is not in great shape."

Initially, Scarlett resisted Campbell’s pressure and, as he described, another missing draft of the dossier circulated on the evening of 17 September retained "paragraph 18, which factually summarises the JIC position". Scarlett was attempting to stand up to Campbell so that the dossier did not misrepresent the JIC's view.

But a factual summary of the JIC position was the last thing Campbell wanted. At 8.21 am on 19 September he emailed Scarlett asking for "just one clearer section on nuclear timelines" and setting out how that might work. He asked that the dossier should make an entirely false claim, that "the JIC assessed in early 2002 that they could produce a weapon in between one and two years".

When the next draft appeared later that morning the fabricated timeline was, as Campbell had requested, deployed in a single paragraph to undercut the JIC’s assessment. The fabricated timeline was not directly attributed to the JIC but the phrase "we judge" (p28) was used so that – in a document whose judgements were said to "reflect the views of the JIC" – it appeared that this was the view of the JIC.

So while Campbell did not get his way entirely on this point, he did use a fabricated claim to make it look as if there was more to worry about than the JIC believed. He did this by "bombarding" Scarlett with demands until he gave way. Significantly, Scarlett gave up on his attempt to retain a paragraph that factually summarised the JIC’s position. Equally significantly, this episode proves that the dossier was, in the words indirectly attributed by BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan to Dr David Kelly, "sent back to be sexed-up", which is no doubt why the government buried the 17 September draft.

Presenting the dossier to Parliament on 24 September 2002, Blair made no mention of the JIC assessment that Iraq could not produce a nuclear weapon at all if sanctions remained effective. He told the Commons

"There will be [people] who say rightly that, for example, on present going, it could be several years before Saddam acquires a usable nuclear weapon — though if he were able to purchase fissile matériel illegally, it would be only a year or two." (column 5)

Taking Campbell’s lead, Blair presented Parliament with a fabricated timescale that differed from one that factually summarised the JIC’s true position. In doing so he did what the government’s own counsel had described at the Hutton Inquiry as the essence of the Gilligan allegations:

"… that the Government was guilty of political interference with the presentation of intelligence in the dossier, that it had presented as the advice of the intelligence services material which did not in fact reflect that advice…."

Next: Alastair Campbell’s changes to the dossier