The written and oral evidence

Although a number of the main protaganists in the developing row, including Andrew Gilligan and Dr David Kelly, appeared before the inquiry, these pages concentrate on the written and oral evidence put forward by Campbell and by the Foreign Office, specifically Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. A close examination shows how the government’s story evolved, including differences between the versions and what was said and what was not said. As has been widely reported, Campbell seriously misled the Committee – but so did Straw.

The Foreign Office’s memoranda

The Foreign Office submitted a number of memoranda to the Committee, in response to specific questions. These can be found here.

From the first memorandum, dated 16 June 2003, the Foreign Office misled the Committee about both the authorship of the dossier and about the 45 minutes claim. Asked "Who was the author?", the Foreign Office replied:

The drafting was co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff working with representatives of other departments, including the intelligence agencies, DIS and FCO. The final draft was approved by the JIC.

This is not a direct lie, but it can be seen that the Foreign Office avoided answering the question.

Asked, "Was the wording of the "45 minutes" claim given on p 19 of the document Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, exactly the same as it was in the intelligence assessment supplied to the Government?", the Foreign Office replied:

The same report was reflected in almost identical terms in the JIC's classified work.

This was a direct lie. Both the original SIS/MI6 report and the JIC's classified assessment referred to (battlefield) munitions but the dossier referred to "weapons of mass destruction".

On 19 June the Foreign Office sent a further memorandum. In response to a question, "Was the wording in the September Dossiers as a whole the same in substance as in the JIC assessments on which it was based? Please list any material differences between the two" the Foreign Office replied as follows:

The dossiers accurately reflected the judgements from the classified JIC assessments.

This was another direct lie. The majority of the judgements in the dossier were fabricated.

The memorandum also gave answers to specific points raised by an expert, Dr Thomas Inch. He had commented: "It is important to find what the raw data actually said about 45 minutes." In response to this direct request for an unvarnished account of what the intelligence report actually said, the Foreign Office again directly misled the Committee:

The JIC assessment said that some CBW weapons could be delivered to units within 45 minutes of an order being issued.

Campbell’s first memorandum

On 22 June, Alastair Campbell sent Tony Blair a letter acknowledging that Blair and Straw had agreed that he should after all appear before the Committee. This letter contained the draft text of a memorandum to the FAC and was circulated to, amongst others, Joint Intelligence Committee John Scarlett with a request that the views of SIS/MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove be sought. This appears to have caused something of a delay. Although it was intended that the memorandum would be attached to a letter from Jack Straw informing the FAC that Campbell would appear, it was not ready when the letter was sent the next day and the final version was not sent until 24 June.

The Hutton Inquiry’s legal team subsequently produced a single document highlighting the changes that Campbell made after consulting Scarlett and Dearlove. This shows that he originally wanted to say that

"the intelligence judgements were entirely those of the JIC and there was no question of interference with them".

The eventual wording allowed the first claim but stated that

"there was no question of anyone seeking to override them".

So Campbell's attempt to claim that there was no interference was rejected. Even more interesingly, to an assertion that the allegation that the 45 minute claim was "put in at my or No 10’s insistence" was false, Campbell had to add the qualification "against the wishes of the Intelligence Agencies".

Straw’s first Appearance

The most interesting part of Jack Straw’s first appearance before the FAC on 24 June resulted from a line of questioning from John Maples MP on the crucial subject of whether the dossier’s certainty truly represented the existing assessments of the JIC. He asked:

"Are you saying that the JIC document used language like "Iraq has continued to produce chemical and biological agents", it did not say 'may have done' or 'has the capability to'?" (Q803)

Unable to state that the JIC had come to any such conclusion – including the assessment that followed the dossier – Sir Peter Ricketts, the Foreign Office’s then "Director General, Political" resorted to falsely claiming JIC approval for the dossier:

"This document was drafted in the JIC structure and approved by the JIC, so responsibility for it was taken by the Chairman of the JIC."

Committee Chairman Donald Anderson then posed the question that went to the heart of the sexing-up:

"Were any of the ambiguities altered in the progression from the JIC initial report to what ultimately appeared?" (Q804)

Ricketts again resorted to the formula:

"This document was drafted in the JIC and, as far as I am concerned, this is the judgment that the JIC came to."

This FAC would ask directly whether the dossier changed the JIC’s assessments and the government asserted the JIC’s approval of it. Maples had one more stab, perceptively pointing to the uncertainty with which the body of the dossier set out the 45 minute claim:

"That has a ring of truth about it that is the kind of thing an intelligence assessment would say, but that is not reflected in the summary." (Q808)

Ricketts hid behind the dossier’s claim that its judgements reflected the views of the JIC but Maples saw through the lie:

"I have to say ‘reflects the views’ is exactly the kind of wording which high quality officials like yourself and Sir Michael use in documents when we know that does not actually mean these are the words of JIC or this is a document that they have produced."

Campbell’s appearance

Campbell appearance before the FAC on 25 June 2003 was highly dramatic, with Campbell repeatedly accusing the BBC of lying about the dossier, although it is now clear that almost everything that Andrew Gilligan had alleged was true and that it was Campbell who was lying.

Campbell repeatedly and falsely insisted that the dossier was produced by the Joint Intelligence Committee and/or its chairman, John Scarlett.

On the dossier of September 2002 the lead person was the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, it was produced by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Q926)

that was a JIC document, it was produced by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Q927)

The Chairman of the JIC wrote the Executive Summary (Q980)

All I can say to you on that is that the executive summary—and this goes for the entire document—was the product of the pen of the Joint Intelligence Committee chairman. (Q1092)

But the document has the imprimatur of the Joint Intelligence Committee. It is their document and, as I said in my written statement to you, this process evolved at the start though the initial drafting was being done in the Foreign Office. Once the decision was taken for this to be primarily an intelligence-based document, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee took responsibility for it. (Q1032)

Campbell also insisted that the 45 minutes was in the first draft of the dossier, by which he meant the draft produced by John Scarlett on 10 September 2002:

the first draft was put forward by the Chairman of the JIC. (Q977)

When the first draft of the September 2002 dossier was presented to Number 10, I think I am right in saying that was the first time I had seen that. (Q986)

It existed in the very first draft and, as far as I am aware, that part the paper stayed like that (Q987)

Interestingly, Campbell also revealed that Scarlett and his deputy Julian Miller were part of the Coalition Information Centre, whose purpose is to provide propaganda in support of UK involvement in US run wars.

Andrew Mackinlay: Who represents the Cabinet Office on the CIC? You said they are represented; who is he or she? (Q965)

Mr Campbell: From time to time it is the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, it is sometimes his deputy, and that is who it usually is.

Campbell’s Supplementary Memorandum

This memorandum incorrectly bears the date 24 June 2003, which was the date of Campbell’s first memorandum. In fact, it was sent on 27 June, when Jack Straw was appearing before the Committee for a second time.

The lies that Campbell told the Committee are set out in detail elsewhere on this site and in Peter Oborne's book "The rise of political lying".

The memorandum was leaked to the Guardian at the beginning of July. The Guardian reported that:

In the letter to the foreign affairs select committee seen by the Guardian, Mr Campbell states that he raised 11 issues relating to the draft dossier, but none related to the controversial 45-minute claim.

The Daily Telegraph commented:

The letter has strengthened the view of Labour MPs on the committee… that Mr Campbell is not guilty of the charges made by the BBC.

Straw's second appearance

Straw appeared before the Committee for a second time, on 27 June 2003. He was asked by Richard Ottaway MP to comment on Alastair Campbell’s statement to the FAC that the 45 minutes "appeared in the first draft". He answered:

The one produced in September, yes I think so. (Q1202)

Pressed on the point, Straw said:

It appeared in the first draft after the intelligence was received. (Q1212)

He went on to insist repeatedly that all that mattered was that the claim was inserted at the earliest opportunity:

It was in the first draft after the intelligence was received, by definition it could not have been in any earlier draft. (Q1216)

But evidence to the Hutton Inquiry shows that this was simply not true. The intelligence on the claim was received at the end of August 2002, before Tony Blair commissioned the dossier on 3 September. The JIC’s assessment staff included it in a draft of an internal JIC assessment on 5 September. But when those same staff produced drafts of the September dossier’s core section on Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction on 5 and 6 September, they chose not to include the claim.

Straw later added the qualification that the claim was inserted "after it was properly assessed" (1222) but this does not help him either. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2003 report makes clear that the citation of the 45 minutes intelligence from the 5 September draft JIC paper was an account of the "assessed intelligence" (Para 53).

The Report

The Committee's report demonstrates how far it was misled by the evidence of Straw, Campbell and the Foreign Office. It incorrectly stated that "apart from the foreword, the document—including the executive summary—was written by the Chairman of the JIC".

The Committee reported in its conclusions that "the FCO clarified that [the 45 minutes] wording was based on" the JIC's Assessment and quoted the wording given to it as if it were an accurate account. It also concluded, based on Campbell and Straw’s evidence, that the claim: "was included in the first draft of the dossier after responsibility for preparing that document had passed from the FCO to the JIC Chairman, dated 10 September."