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The language of the dossier
The most basic analysis of the dossier's language (see for example the table in this section) will show how it changed as the document was drafted and in particular, how what was said in the published dossier differed from the formal JIC assessments that it claimed to "disclose". The clear intention - and effect - of the changes was to overstate the degree to which intelligence could be relied on. When it comes to a war justified on the basis of intelligence, nothing could be more important. This firming-up went well beyond the omission of qualifications and explicit warnings about the limited intelligence base identified by Butler. Firstly, the language used to describe the intelligence was comprehensively strengthened. Secondly, the position taken by the JIC was misrepresented: significantly, judgements were attributed to the JIC that it had not reached.
The first issue is about the degree to which intelligence points to a particular proposition. At the bottom end of the scale, intelligence might be said to suggest or, slightly higher, to indicate something. At the top end, intelligence is said to demonstrate, show or confirm something. The dossier's drafters systematically changed weak language to stronger language. As Joanna Nadin (a special adviser) told Campbell during the drafting:
"Saying "intelligence suggests that this factory has probably been rebuilt" is not entirely convincing - especially if you do not know what "intelligence" is."
But within the body text of the dossier, the spin doctors did prefer to attribute claims to intelligence rather than rely on "unevidenced assertion" and, as the table shows, routinely changed statements that a document’s authors believed, judged or assessed something to claims that intelligence showed it.
But the "judgements" that were set out in the executive summary were pure unfounded assertion. They purported to replicate the "key judgements" at the front of JIC papers, which represent the JIC formally taking a position on key issues. But the majority of the dossier's "judgements" were fabricated: they were not "key judgements" in JIC papers. This is where the identity of the authors is crucial. While there is a degree of subjectivity inherent in the judgements of formal JIC assessments, what is important is that they are stated to represent the views of a committee that is seen to be both expert and objective. By stating that the dossier represented the disclosure of JIC assessments, Blair gave a spurious credibility to the exaggerated claims of spin doctors.
Strong Language
The Butler Inquiry reported hearing differing views on the extent to which:
"distinctions are intended between such phrases as 'intelligence indicates . . . ', 'intelligence demonstrates . . .' and 'intelligence shows . . .' ", with some witnesses stating "that there is in reality no established glossary, and that drafters and JIC members actually employ their natural language."
There is not necessarily a contradiction here, if it is self-evident that one word is stronger than another, as the following exchange from the the Hutton Inquiry demonstrates with regard to descriptions of the intelligence:
Scarlett: "suggests" normally tends to be slightly weaker than "indicates".
Q: And certainly weaker than "shows"?
Scarlett: Yes.
As BBC Counsel Andrew Caldecott told JIC chairman John Scarlett:
"We have had almost unanimous evidence about this that 'indicates' is the normal language for possibility and 'shows' is the normal language for certainty."
There may of course be a secondary qualification. In another exchange, which might appear at first to contradict what he said above, Scarlett was asked, "… if I say 'something shows this', that is stronger than 'something suggests this'?" He replied, "It depends on context, but it might well be, yes."
So, for example, "intellegence indicates that he may have also delegated this authority to his son Qusai" is clearly very weak. There may also be a distinction to be made according to what might be happening. Intelligence that (e.g.) the development of a weapon is being attempted is different from intelligence that it has been achieved. Intelligence that materiel has been sought is different from intelligence that it has been obtained. Whether something is said to have happened in the past or to be happening currently is also a crucial distinction, particularly in the context of Iraq’s alleged current possession and production of weapons of mass destruction.
What this means is that it is hard to compare levels of certainty where different constructions are used. But where one word or phase is substituted for another, as happened repeatedly with the dossier, it is possible to identify clear changes in both what is being claimed and how strongly claims are expressed.
Other quotes from the Hutton Inquiry show that these distinctions are not something that has been read into the various documents with the benefit of hindsight but issues that were widely seen as important at the time. Martin Howard of the DIS said: (11 August pm, section 131)
"At the time the dossier was produced there was a very wide variety of views on different parts of the dossier and the language that was used in it. They were not differences of view about whether intelligence should be included or not, it was more about how the intelligence was described or how it should be interpreted. It was, for example, the difference between saying 'intelligence suggests', 'intelligence shows', 'intelligence indicates'. These meanings have quite a lot of -- you know, to intelligence analysts they are quite important distinctions."
Dr Brian Jones of the Defence Intelligence Staff told of his concerns, recorded in a memorandum at the time , about the dossier’s claim that intelligence "showed" that Saddam attached great importance to WMD.
Questioned about this at the Hutton Inquiry, Jones again made clear that "shows" was the language of absolute certainty.
Jones: I think we felt that it was reasonable to say that the intelligence indicated that this was the case; and I think I felt it was a reasonable conclusion to draw; but we did not think -- we did not think the intelligence showed it absolutely beyond any shadow of doubt.
Q: And there is a difference, I take it, from your answer between "indicates" and "shows"?
Jones: Yes
(3 September am. Section 93, line 21 – Section 94, line 4)
"We know"
In the same memorandum Dr Jones had also objected to the use of the phrase "we know" in relation to the alleged current production of biological weapons. This was a key expression in the dossier, which claimed to set out "what we know of Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes" . The later JIC assessments, to the extent that they are published in the Butler Report, shied away from this word in respect of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons – except in the negative: "we … know little about Iraq’s CBW work since late 1998". Where something is not thought to be in doubt, assessments were more likely to use an expression such as "it is clear" or to make an assertion without qualification.
JIC Key Judgements
The other change that was strongly opposed during the drafting of the dossier was the creation of new "judgements", particularly the one relating to the 45 minutes claim . The points highlighted in the key judgements section of a JIC paper carry a certain weight and status that derive from the status of their authors. As John Scarlett told the Hutton Inquiry: "The key judgments represent the formal view of the JIC on the central questions which are being considered in the assessment itself." (23 September am; Section 78, lines 20-22) What is important is that the JIC has felt the evidence sufficient – and the point sufficiently pertinent – to reach a conclusion and, while this is to some extent subjective, it is the expertise and presumed objectivity of the JIC that allows its judgements to be seen as authoritative.
This is why the dossier "borrowed" from the authority of the JIC by claiming to disclose its assessments and why, when its claims came back to haunt the government, it again used the JIC’s expertise and objectivity as a shield. As Blair told the late Robin Cook in the House of Commons:
"I shall certainly not stand here and say that that assessment is wrong, as the committee's judgment is that it was right. The committee is in a better position to make that judgment than either me or, with respect, my right hon. Friend." (4 June 2003, Hansard, column 154 )
This quote – concerning the 45 minute claim – highlights the fact that judgements made by, or attributed to, the JIC appear to carry the same weight and status, whether they result from an assessment reached when inconclusive evidence is considered in a wider context or are a re-iteration of something that intelligence has proved beyond doubt. Their presentation in bullet points as unqualified assertions means that if taken out of context they can be very misleading.
Both the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and Butler reports described this phenomenon. The ISC noted that:
"The 9 September JIC Assessment … did not highlight in the key judgements the uncertainties and gaps in the UK’s knowledge about the Iraqi biological and chemical weapons. These points were covered in the main text of the assessment." (Paragraph 67)
Butler developed this point:
"Experienced readers would have seen these warnings in the original JIC assessments and taken them into account in reading them. But the public, through reading the dossier, would not have known of them." (Main text, para 331)
But neither the ISC nor Butler realised the extent to which the dossier included judgements that were not in the original JIC assessments. The result was exactly as the spin doctors wanted the intelligence deployed: a series of unqualified statements bearing the authority of the JIC.
The Impact
While many of these distinctions are undoubtedly questions of semantics, they make a real difference when intelligence is presented to the public. They are also undoubtedly presentational changes but, combined with the knowledge of who made them, they prove that the government was guilty of the allegation against it in the very terms that it had used: "guilty of political interference with the presentation of intelligence in the dossier, that it had presented as the advice of the intelligence services material which did not in fact reflect that advice…."
To state that one knows what one only believes is a lie, particularly if one has privately admitted to knowing "little". To state that it is believed that something is the case when it is only thought that it might be the case is also a lie, particularly when it is claimed that the belief is held by the body whose job it is to assess such matters objectively. The biggest lie of all was the statement that the dossier "disclosed" the assessments of the JIC. Not only had many of the dossier’s judgments and claims never appeared in a JIC paper, neither had they or the dossier subsequently been approved by the JIC.
The dossier is full of lies of these types and there is a consistent pattern. Where the JIC said it is possible or intelligence indicates, the dossier said we judge and/or intelligence shows or intelligence confirms. Blair’s claim about the ongoing production of WMD went from being something that intelligence indicated to something that was judged from intelligence to something that intelligence showed to something "established beyond doubt". These were the lies on which the case for war was based.