Why the draft matters

The main significance of the draft is that it is proof that the involvement of four government spin doctors on the inside of the process of drafting the dossier extended to actually drafting the document and was not, as was claimed (Section 83), limited to attendance at meetings. Its timing is particularly significant. It was produced before the draft that the government has always claimed was the first, that produced by Joint Intelligence Committee chairman John Scarlett on 10 September 2002. The government has always said that the Scarlett draft was both the first (full) draft and the first to include the claim that Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within 45 minutes. The second statement appears to be true, given that the Williams draft does not include the claim, but this merely demonstrates that the second statement was untrue and that, as BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan alleged, the claim was "not in the original draft".

The Williams draft also matters because it was covered-up. Although he was eventually given the draft, Hutton was told that it was "not taken forward". Consequently, he did not mention its existence in his report but expressly stated that "Drafts of the complete dossier were prepared dated: 10/11 September, 16 September, 19 September, 20 September". (para 176)

Indeed, both the contents of Williams' draft and his subsequent contribution to drafting of the dossier it destroys the government's core story on the dossier - that Williams' involvement was rejected on the grounds that it was incompatible with Scarlett's "ownership" of the document.

How the draft arose

The first meeting to plan the dossier took place On 5 September 2002, two days after Tony Blair had announced that it would be published. Exactly what was agreed at this meeting remains unclear. An email that Campbell sent Jonathan Powell after the meeting states that the dossier was to be substantially rewritten, with Scarlett and his deputy Julian Miller "in charge". Scarlett was asked at the Hutton Inquiry what this referred to and suggested that this only meant that he would write the section on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction:

This is a reference to the overall dossier, referring to Iraq and WMD, but also to the other two parts. But it is a particular reference to the section on WMD. It related the agreement that we had reached at that meeting, although the agreement, in some respects, was not completely tied down at that stage.

An entry in Alastair Campbell's diary for that day reveals that "John Williams was offering to write [the dossier] full-time". Questioned at the Hutton Inquiry about this, Campbell claimed that this "kind offer" was rejected, although his account leaves a gap of several days between the offer and its rejection:

The decision was taken, either at that meeting or certainly by the 9th, that John Scarlett, I think if we go on to the 9th, I mean he talked about -- he used the word "ownership", that John Scarlett felt he ought to have ownership of the dossier. And I emphasised, and this was spelt out in the minute that I circulated following these meetings.

...

I made the point and John Scarlett made the point that was not sensible, it should be written by John Scarlett. (Sections 11-12)

But it was in the gap between 5 and 9 September that Williams got to work. On the 5th, he redrafted the "capping piece" that at that time represented the dossier's foreword. On 6 September, he emailed a note to Campbell, stating that he had Straw’s permission to carry out a "the media-friendly editorial job" on the dossier. This note, with its use of the definite article, shows that Williams had an expectation that the "job" would fall to him.

The Cabinet Office has stated that it does not have any information as to whether Campbell replied, in writing or otherwise. But it previously told the Hutton Inquiry that Williams produced his draft of the dossier on 7 and 8 September. According to the Information Tribunal, the FCO told the Information Commissioner that the draft was "prepared at the request of the JIC Chairman to provide an expert’s view of how the confidential JIC prepared draft might be presented in a published document.".

It has now emerged that the starting point for Williams' draft was an even earlier document sent to him by the Coalition Information Centre, a propaganda unit within the Foreign Office that Campbell set up to promote UK involvement in US-led wars.

The 9 September meetings

There were two very important meetings on the dossier on 9 September 2002. Williams attended both of them. The first, during the morning, was said to be a "planning" meeting and was chaired throughout by Campbell.

The second meeting, that afternoon, was the first meeting of the dossier drafting group. Williams was so central to this meeting that it was described in an email as "a Cab Off meeting at 2pm today w John Williams on the dossier".

We know about the Williams draft because of a direct reference to it in an email the following day from No 10 press officer Daniel Pruce to Mark Matthews . Pruce referred to "John’s draft of 9 September". Scarlett told the Hutton Inquiry that this was the Williams draft. Pruce had also attended the dossier drafting group and his email shows that Williams' draft was being taken forward. Pruce anticipated "John's further draft tomorrow", which appears to have referred to Scarlett’s draft.

"Considerable help"

When Scarlett sent his draft to Campbell later on 10 September he expressly mentioned Williams' contribution : "This has been significantly recast, with considerable help from John Williams and others in the Foreign Office." The Foreign Office has confirmed that Williams did not produce the 'Regime' or 'UN Weapons Inspections' sections of the dossier, which would appear to confirm that Williams’ "considerable help" went beyond the sections that it produced. Williams was already "looking at the text [of the new draft], and may offer further views from New York".

On 10 September, Pruce sent a further email headed "DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)". He wrote "My initial thoughts on this latest draft". All of this shows that the Scarlett draft was not the first draft as claimed, but one of a series. It may indicate that Pruce regarded the CIC document (above) as a draft.

Summary

The government's entire defence to the claim that it sexed-up the dossier depends on the claim that it was drafted exclusively within the JIC machinery and specifically that the first draft was produced by John Scarlett on 10 September without any spin doctor interference. None of this is true. What we know about the Williams draft is that it was a part of the process - and indeed continued to be after it was supposedly established that Scarlett had "ownership" of the dossier - and that it was the forerunner of the Scarlett draft. In fact, Williams originated the executive summary of the dossier, which purported to present the 'judgements' of the JIC.

Next: The role of John Williams